Social movements, the mobilization of professional com munities associated with economic growth and diversity, and rent seeking by interest groups have long been seen as important explanations for the growth of government. Economic and social groups have mobilized in various areas of political life, leading to the creation of new gov ernment programs, services, and protections. In a recent article, Leech and several colleagues showed that the reverse is also true (Leech et al. 2005 ; for extensions to the state level, see Baumgartner, Gray, and Lowery, forth coming; Gray et al. 2005; Lowery et al. 2004) . As govern ment has become involved in a wider range of activities in diverse areas of the economy, interest group mobiliza tion has been stimulated. Groups respond to the mobiliza tion of government, just as government responds to the mobilization of groups.
Government stimulates the growth and mobilization of interest groups not only by direct subsidy and contracts, as Walker (1983 Walker ( , 1991 demonstrated, but also and on a much larger scale simply by expanding its range of activ ities. Campbell (2005) , for example, showed that the Social Security program transformed the patterns of political mobilization of the entire elderly generation, significantly increasing their interest and engagement in politics, espe cially among those most dependent on their Social Security income. This mobilization followed, rather than preceded, the change in government policy. The effects go far beyond direct federal spending. Much more important are regula tory activities of all kinds. These encourage some groups to mobilize to protect the government rules that help them, while other groups are mobilized to fight the level of government control in a given area. The more activity, the more groups of all kinds have reason to get involved in the policy process. Increased government activity in a broader range of economic and social sectors therefore has a stimulating, "demand" effect on the interest group community as a whole. In this article, we update and expand on the analysis conducted by Leech and colleagues (2005) , confirming their results with a longer time series relating to the effects of congressional activities on group mobili zation and adding a new analysis of the effects of presi dential involvement in policy. The results strongly support a demandside theory of group mobilization.
Our results show important interbranch dynamics in this process as presidential activities, measured alone, have a strong mobilizing effect on groups. However, these effects are heavily dependent on the issue domain. We distinguish between those areas where presidents have tra ditionally played a more important policy role and those
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where Congress has dominated or where powers have been more equally shared. Increased presidential actions in those domains where presidents dominate serve to dep ress congressional lobbying. Presidential actions in con gressionally dominated domains have no effect beyond that of congressional activity.
Driving the Lobbying Community
Political observers at points throughout the twentieth century and up to the present have exclaimed over the continuing growth of the U.S. interest group system (for a discussion, see Baumgartner and Leech 1998, 106.) . With each passing year, the lobbying community in Washington grows larger, although not always growing at the same rate or in the same policy areas. Why does the lobbying community continue to expand in size? And how is this growth related to the parallel growth in the size of gov ernment that we have seen across the same period? What drives its growth and what encourages growth in some places rather than others? There are three, not necessarily mutually exclusive, possibilities. First, both growth in the lobbying community and growth in the size of govern ment could be driven by external changes in the social economic environment. This is the argument put forth by Truman (1951) in his discussion of "disturbances" and the ways in which these disruptions to the status quo encourage new groups to form or existing groups to take new actions. Changes in the economy or in society more generally would thus result in increases in the numbers of interest groups, since more groups would be needed to address issues arising from these changes. Although the underlying collective action problems and differential abilities to organize identified by Olson (1965) means that this response to disturbances will not apply equally to all groups, some subsequent research has found sup port for the idea that interest groups mobilize more easily when their interests are threatened (Hansen 1985 , Walker 1991 ; but for a contrary finding see Lowery et al. 2005) .
The second possibility is that the growth in the interest group community is driven by interest groups themselves as they organize to seek economic advantages in the form of rents from government (Buchanan and Tullock 1962, Buchanan 1980) . In this scenario, entrepreneurs see that organizing a new interest group or mobilizing an existing group to lobby in Washington would be to their advan tage (Salisbury 1969) . The entrepreneurs work to help the potential groups overcome the collective action problems inherent in organizing, and the groups then seek eco nomic advantages through the power of the political pro cess rather than through the market. These advantages may be in the form of direct subsidies or in the form of protective regulations; in either case, the result would be a constant drive to increase the size of the interest group system.
The third possibility is that the growth in the interest group system comes in large part from forces within government itself. Government encourages interest group growth in part through direct patronage (Truman 1951, 86; Walker 1983 Walker , 1991 Campbell 2003) , but more imp ortantly simply by bringing issues to the table that groups may care about. In particular, it is government activity that determines in which policy areas growth occurs. While certainly some groups under some circumstances may come to Washington without encouragement from within government, the first two explanations fail to recognize that the policymaking process poses a secondlevel col lective action problem. Even once an interest has suc cessfully overcome the collective action problem inherent in becoming a viable interest group in the first place, there still are costs involved in the decision to lobby on any particular policy. While an interest group may want government officials to legislate or regulate in a particu lar policy area, expending resources is risky because not only might the effort be unsuccessful, but the issue itself might be virtually ignored.
The resource in shortest supply in Washington is atten tion (Jones and Baumgartner 2005, Baumgartner, Gray, and Lowery, forthcoming) . At any given point in time, there is a potentially limitless supply of possible issues that elected officials and interest groups could be work ing on. Even once issues make it to the formal legislative agenda, they join more than eight thousand new bills in each twoyear Congress, of which only about four hun dred become law. Any given political actor can put time and effort into only a few. In this situation, it is in the best interest of interest groups to be working on an issue that has some likelihood of moving forward, rather than spin ning their wheels and wasting time on an issue that no one else is likely to pay attention to.
1 This pattern of inter est group behavior has been shown to play out empirically as well as theoretically; Baumgartner and Leech (2001) show that a majority of the lobbying effort is focused on a fraction of the issues. Most interest groups are spending time working on the same issues. The central question is which issues and which issue areas will attract enough actors to make it worthwhile to spend time and effort on them. Interest groups spend a vast amount of time moni toring their policy environments (Heinz et al. 1993) , and one of the most important things they are looking for is an indication that the time is ripe for a particular issue. While political actors inside as well as outside govern ment are making the same calculations, those inside gov ernment are much better placed to send convincing signals 5 that an issue is about to move forward. The most straight forward way this can be accomplished is simply by hold ing a hearing on the topic.
Government activity in a policy area therefore lowers the risk that an interest group's efforts will be for naught and thus lowers the cost to the interest group for partici pating. Most interest group activity is therefore expected to gravitate toward policy areas in which government is already active. Interest groups do have a role in agenda setting, but that role very seldom drives the size of the interest group population beyond the existing status quo. A few interest groups may petition government, but large numbers will not join in unless there is a strong probabil ity of action. Government activity draws the lobbyists to the issue by providing a coordination point for other polit ical actors to focus on, thereby suggesting that interest group effort has a chance of success.
Given this pattern of interest group involvement, pres idential activity should be of particular importance. Schol ars have noted that presidents have a substantial ability to direct attention to a particular set of issues (Kingdon 1995; Baumgartner and Jones 1993) . Major presidential initia tives do not always pass, but they virtually always attract substantial attention from members of Congress and other members of the political community. Studies of presiden tial State of the Union addresses, for example, indicate that presidents are able to set the public agenda, in the short run, in a limited number of policy areas, as well as in the long run for foreign policy issues (Cohen 1995; Hill 1998) . These annual calls to Congress to act on vari ous proposals or policy areas should therefore exert an impact on lobbying activity. In addition, presidents often call on representatives of interest groups to serve on advi sory commissions that provide legitimacy for presidential policy positions (Chin and Lindquist 2004) , and orga nized interests with close ties to the administration are called on to help provide support for those positions by lobbying Congress and otherwise mobilizing around the issue (Peterson 1990) .
We thus predict that levels of lobbying will increase as government activity increases, and we expect those increases to be issue specific. We link data collected from federal lobbying disclosure reports to indicators of con gressional and presidential activities drawn from the Policy Agendas Project (www.policyagendas.org). The Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995 requires lobbyists to report their activities in each of seventyfour specific issue areas (later expanded to seventysix domains). Leech et al. (2005) demonstrated that fiftysix of these issue areas could be linked to the topic coding system used in the Policy Agendas Project, covering about 85 percent of the lobbying reports. We follow this same procedure here, updating the earlier analysis from just four time points to sixteen sixmonth periods from 1996 to 2003. Since the publication of the earlier article, new data resources relat ing to presidential activities have also become available through the Policy Agendas Project. These include a sum mary of the topic discussed in each sentence of the presi dent's annual State of the Union address and a data set consisting of every executive order of the president. These data resources are coded by topic category using the iden tical system as the congressional hearings. We provide further detail on the data sets and measures in the next section.
Congress, the President, and the Demand for Lobbying
Congressional hearings can be used as a general indicator of the intensity of interest or activity in an issue area. Hearings may relate to legislation, to bureaucratic over sight, or simply to information gathering. In any case, interest is rarely neutral; it means that Congress is actively considering some new legislation, overseeing the activi ties of a bureaucratic agency, or directing attention to a policy area. Since hearings are an indicator of congres sional involvement in a policy area, we expect that hear ings should have a driving effect on lobbying activity-the more hearings, the greater the number of lobbyists who will register. Note that speaking or testifying at the hear ings themselves will not have any direct impact on our dependent variable, since lobbyists are not required to register if their activities are limited to testifying. Rather, the increases in lobbying occur because hearings indi cate the level of government activity in the issue area more generally.
Presidential actions are expected to affect the mobili zation of lobbyists as well. The number of statements on a topic in a given State of the Union address is used as one indicator of presidential activity. In State of the Union addresses, presidents list a number of agenda items for congressional consideration. While the argument has been made that the State of the Union address does not pro vide an exhaustive expression of the president's agenda (Rudalevige 2002) , the address is generally viewed as a good indicator of presidential priorities. The number of executive orders issued on a given topic in a given year is a second indicator of presidential activity. Research indi cates that executive orders have gradually evolved from a primarily administrative tool to a policymaking tool; they have become a means for presidents to take control of certain policy areas by acting first and relying on the inability of Congress to respond quickly and avoid its col lective action problems (Mayer 2001) . Howell (2003) has 6 Political Research Quarterly 64 (1) argued that as Congress becomes more fragmented, pres idents have more freedom to act unilaterally and issue more significant executive orders. We have created an index of presidential activity by combining the number of executive orders and the amount of attention to the issue in the State of the Union speech using Stata's factor com mand.
2 The resulting variable allows a single indicator of presidential activity.
One caveat to our analysis of presidential activities is that the greatest emphasis in the Lobbying Disclosure Act is on congressional activities. Virtually all congressional lobbying activity must be reported, whereas the definition of "covered officials" within the executive branch includes only more senior members, down to the level of under secretaries, assistant directors, and members of commis sions, such as the Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission. As a result, much of the routine contact between lobbyists and staff members in executive agen cies need not be reported in the lobbying registration reports. Nonetheless, executive orders requiring agency action would virtually always include actions by agency officials in top policymaking positions. Interest group activities and their lobbying reports should reflect that tendency. Table 1 presents average annual levels of congressional and presidential activity across the fiftysix issue areas. We distinguish in the table between presidential domains and others.
Presidential activity tends to be focused on just a few areas: defense, health care, and foreign affairs as well as civil rights, education, and the other issues listed in at the top of the table. Those issue areas that have a mean of 1.0 or greater on the index of presidential activity are consid ered presidential domains. Theoretically, these areas of high presidential activity can be explained by three over lapping factors: a constitutional comparative advantage, the implementation of national security, and pet policy projects that presidents carry over from their campaigns. The commanderinchief role gives presidents more auto nomy in defense and foreign affairs (Wildavsky 1964) . National security concerns encompass both international and domestic threats, which include law enforcement and civil rights and civil liberties issues. During the time period of study, 1996 to 2004, the two presidents who held office pushed hard and took the lead on their personal policy objectives. For Clinton, this was health care and welfare. George W. Bush entered office with education as a top priority, but then had defense and foreign affairs thrust upon him with the September 11th attacks.
Presidents speak a lot about the environment, trade, and taxation in their State of the Union addresses, and Table 1 shows that these areas also have high scores on our index of presidential activity because of this. We do not include these as part of the presidential domain, however, because these areas do not meet our threshold. Additionally, they are not areas where presidents have autonomy over Con gress. Whereas we expect that presidential activity in presidential domains will have a significant impact on lobbying (decreas ing the congressional focus of the lob bying effort), we expect no impact of presidential actions in those areas that are outside of the presidential domain. Therefore, in the analysis below, we test two models, one including the presidential activity index, and the other where we interact this with a dummy variable scored 1 for presidential domains and 0 for other areas. Effectively, this simply substitutes a value of 0 for the presidential activity index in all nonpresidential domains.
Congressional actions are widely dispersed through out the fiftysix areas, as one would expect because of the committee structure. However, there is considerably more attention in Congress to many of those areas also of concern to the president. Of course, both presidential and congressional actions vary not only by issue area but also over time, as we discuss below.
Tables 2 and 3 present the number of registered groups (Table 2 ) and hired lobbyists ( Table 3 ). Note that all our analyses are based on fiftysix issue areas and sixteen time periods, so there is variation both across domains and over time.
The mobilization of interest groups in Washington differs substantially by issue area. An average of six hun dred interest organizations lobbying on their own behalf and 1,100 lobbying firms hired to represent interest orga nizations register in each sixmonth period in the area of taxation, but only eight organizations and fourteen hired firms work in the area of District of Columbia affairs. This is unremarkable, as some issue domains are substan tively much more important than others, involving much more government spending and affecting more Americans. The two types of variance apparent in our data actually present us with an opportunity and a challenge. To the extent that all the variability is from one issue area to another, this may reflect the substantive importance of the domains and the relative mobilization of social groups for the long term. These factors are likely to vary rela tively little from year to year, however. To the extent that we observe variation in the mobilization of lobbyists over time, this cannot be attributed to such slowly changing factors as demographic or economic trends. Controlling for the amount of activity in the previous time period effectively allows us to isolate the impact of changes in government activity on the mobilization of groups, other things held equal.
We take advantage of the variation not only across issue domains but also over time. The table therefore presents the standard deviations associated with the average levels of lobbying mobilization and the coefficient of variation, which is simply the mean value divided by the standard (1) deviation. Series where the mean is much greater than the variance will have a very high coefficient of variation; series where the variance is higher than the mean would have scores below 1. These figures make clear that while there is some variation over time, the bulk of the variance is across issue areas, not over time.
The level of inertia in lobby registrations is extraordi nary. Leech et al. (2005) showed this in their Tables 1 and  2 and in the related appendix tables to their original arti cle. For organizations lobbying on their own behalf, a simple regression of the number of registrations predicted by the number in the previous time period (with a con stant term) shows an R 2 of 0.98. For organizations lobby ing on the behalf of clients, there is greater variation; the simple regression produces an R 2 of 0.84. The data in Tables 2 and 3 show similar characteristics. Looking at the last row shows that the average issue area has an aver age of 113 groups and that this number is associated with a standard deviation of only 18; there is very little varia tion around the average value. Hired lobbying firms show an average of 234 and a standard deviation of 80, indicat ing not only much greater use of hired lobbyists than in house work but also much more variability over time.
These characteristics suggest several things. First, org anizations lobbying on their own behalf register in a given issue area because they have interests there and they are highly likely to remain interested, and registered, in sub sequent periods. Second, organizations with fleeting or temporary interests in a field where they are not routinely involved will hire a firm to represent them in that area rather than establish their own presence there. Third, the small amount of remaining variance over time makes it very difficult statistically to find significant coefficients, once lagged registrations are included. Finally, there is gre ater statistical opportunity to explain the behavior of paid lobbyists rather than organizations lobbying on their own behalf, since there is greater periodtoperiod varia tion there.
Analysis
Having explained the structure of our data, we move to the analysis. We have several simple hypotheses. First, we expect to confirm the previous results by Leech and coll eagues when using our extended time series. Specifically, Furthermore, these results should hold with controls for each other as well as with controls for the level of lobbying in the same issue area in the previous time period.
Controls for the amount of lobbying in the previous six month period effectively control for a range of alternative hypotheses, including virtually all social and economic factors, as such things as demographic shifts, income, and social movement mobilizations are not likely to change much during any sixmonth period. Any longterm impacts of such things as the greater mobilization of professionals rather than the unemployed are already reflected in the number of groups lobbying in the previous period. The huge variation across the different issue areas certainly reflects the bias in the ability of different social groups to mobilize in Washington. Our focus here is to know whether shortterm variability in congressional actions affects the mobilization of Washington lobbyists. There is no ques tion that longerrun social trends also matter. These are incorporated into our analysis by use of the lagged depen dent variable in our models, and therefore our analysis can be considered one of asking whether congressional actions affect the mobilization of groups after the longrun effects of social mobilizations have been taken into account.
Finally, we add new variables here to the earlier analy sis. We expect the following:
Hypothesis 4: Presidential actions in presidential domains will cause a shift away from congres sional focus in lobbying. Hypothesis 5: In areas outside of presidential domains, presidential actions will have no effect on the mobilization of lobbyists, controlling for congressional actions.
Finally, these hypotheses suggest that inclusion of presidential activities into the model will show an increased impact of congressional actions in those areas outside of the presidential domain. In effect, the previous models may have underestimated the impact of congressional actions on lobbying activity because they did not control for lobbying directed at the executive branch. Since this lobbying is likely to be focused on some issue domains more than others, including presidential activities in the model should increase the estimated impact of Congress in nonpresidential domains.
Hypothesis 6: The effect of congressional actions on the mobilization of lobbying in nonpresi dential domains will be higher when we control for presidential actions than in a model without presidential actions included.
First, we replicate the results shown by Leech and her colleagues (2005) . Tables 4 through 7 present these results. Table 4 shows these results for lobbying organiza tions (e.g., organizations lobbying on their own behalf in Washington), and Table 6 shows the results for lobbying firms (e.g., hired lobbyists working on behalf of clients). Models 1 through 4 in each table replicate the original findings virtually exactly.
3 Model 5 then drops the vari able for firms from the original model. The number of firms active in the same area of the economy was included in the original analysis as a measure of social or eco nomic supply, since sectors with greater economic activ ity might generate more lobbying activity. The original analysis showed that this variable was insignificant in its impact when previous lobbying activity was included, as model 4 indicates in both tables. As inclusion of the firms variable caused a significant loss of data, because the data were not available for all fiftysix issue areas and cannot be collected for each of the sixteen sixmonth time periods we include in our extended analysis, we omit this variable in our extension of the original work. As model 5 shows, there is no substantively important difference in the results between model 4 and model 5, so we proceed without the firms variable. Table 5 presents the full analysis of the extended time series now available. The first model shows that twenty additional hearings in any issue area (that is, about one standard deviation) can be expected to result in about thirtysix more groups registering to lobby in that area. Controlling for the level of federal spending in the issue area causes the number of observations to drop substan tially (because we do not have spending data for each of the fiftysix issue areas where we have hearings and lobby registration information), but the substantive impact remains virtually the same: forty more groups for every twenty hearings and a small effect for spending. For each $100 billion in spending, we would expect to see an increase of about five registered interest groups. This effect is statistically significant now that it is based on many more observations than in the earlier published analysis. However, overall federal spending across the entire budget was less than $2.5 trillion in 2003, so this effect within any given issue area would substantively be related to at most only a few more group registrations. Finally, model 3 is the most appropriate and accurate model, controlling as it does for the number of groups registered to lobby in the previous time period. Here we see significant coefficients both for hearings and for spend ing. Comparing the results from Tables 4 and 5 shows that our extended time coverage confirms the earlier anal ysis. Some of the coefficients change in size, but all the effects are now significant and the analysis is based on a Observations  224  104  42  42  78 Coefficients computed using ordinary least squares with panel-corrected standard errors, which appear in parentheses. *p < .10. **p < .05. ***p < .01 (two-tailed tests). Coefficients computed using ordinary least squares with panel-corrected standard errors, which appear in parentheses. *p < .10. ** p < .05. ***p < .01 (two-tailed tests).
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Political Research Quarterly 64(1) much larger empirical base. Considering our discussion earlier about the high levels of inertia in the lobbying pat terns we observe, the significant effects we observe in model 3 are very strong. Controlling for how many lob byists were active in the previous period, we see a signifi cant effect for increased or decreased numbers of hearings on the number of lobbyists registered in that time period. Table 6 shows an identical series of results for hired contract lobbyists rather than for organizations lobbying on their own behalf, as in Table 4 . These results are stron ger than those for the groups analyzed in Table 4 because there are greater numbers of contract lobbyists, with more variation from area to area and from time period to time period. In any case, the results largely reconfirm the original analysis but put these findings on a much more substantial empirical footing. 4 We turn now to an analysis of the ways in which presi dential and congressional activities affect the mobiliza tion of lobbyists. Tables 8 and 9 present the results. The tables are identical to the final models presented in Tables  5 and 7 but with presidential actions now added to the model. Table 8 presents the full analysis of the extended time series for organizations with the addition of our newly developed indicator of presidential activity. We include as model 1 in both cases the results from the final models presented in Tables 5 and 7 , which did not include the presidential variable. Furthermore, we include only the interactive term for presidential actions. This allows us to distinguish those issue domains where the president is a major policy player from those that are more Congress focused. This improved specification has several interest ing impacts on the coefficients. First, the estimated impact of the hearings variable increases substantially in each case (from .18 to .30 for organizations and from 2.05 to 3.14 in the model for firms). That is, hearings generate much greater mobilization by lobbyists than we had pre viously estimated, for those areas that are dominated by Congress. While theory leads us to expect that the overall impact of presidential and congressional policymaking activities will be to stimulate greater lobbying, we see these effects most strongly in the areas dominated by Congress. Some of the apparent depressive effect of pres idential actions may be because of the legislative branch focus of the disclosure requirements under the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995. Lobbying reports are systemati cally lower in those areas where the president tradition ally is active and increasingly so in those periods where there is heightened presidential policymaking activity. This could occur as lobbyists shift their actions to the executive branch, where much of that activity need not be reported under current requirements. In those areas where the president is a substantial player, increases in presi dential activity have a substantial depressive effect on congressional lobbying, as the large and strongly signifi cant coefficients for these terms show. We present more complete results of these models in Appendix Tables A1  and A2 (see appendix tables at http://prq.sagepub.com/ supplemental/). In these tables, we present the presiden tial activity variable across the board as well as interacted with the presidential domain dummy variable. Further more, we present those variables without including the hearings and spending variables to show their direct effects. Results are highly robust. Leech et al. (2005) argued that group mobilization is often in response to, rather than the cause of, government activities. While social and economic mobilization affect the development of the interest group universe, so too does government activity itself. Recent work has con firmed and extended these findings. Baumgartner, Gray, and Lowery (forthcoming) found that congressional hear ings stimulated subsequent interest group mobilization in the state capitals. That is, even controlling for state legis lative activities, actions in Congress caused groups to mobilize in those same issue areas in the fifty states. Observations  224  104  42  42  78 Coefficients computed using ordinary least squares with panel-corrected standard errors, which appear in parentheses. *p < .10. **p < .05. ***p < .01 (two-tailed tests). Coefficients computed using ordinary least squares with panel-corrected standard errors, which appear in parentheses. *p < .10. **p < .05. ***p < .01 (two-tailed tests). Coefficients computed using ordinary least squares with panel-corrected standard errors, which appear in parentheses. *p < .10. **p < .05. ***p < .01 (two-tailed tests). Coefficients computed using ordinary least squares with panel-corrected standard errors, which appear in parentheses. *p < .10. **p < .05. ***p < .01 (two-tailed tests).
Conclusion
Clearly, federal government activities send strong cues to interested constituencies. In response to increased levels of federal activities, affected interests mobilize to fight off the new federal incursions, move to encourage the activity, or attempt to modify the proposals before they are completed. In any case, we see that state action affects group mobilization, not only the reverse.
In this article, we confirm and extend the original find ings by Leech et al. (2005) in three ways. One is simply by adding additional time points and more observations, showing more robust and stronger findings than in the original. With a substantial number of additional obser vations now available, we show that the first findings are clearly robust. Second, we clarified the earlier model by dropping the longterm hearings variable where a lagged dependent variable was also used. Third, we have explored the impact of presidential involvement. Our treatment here is certainly not the last word on this topic. Our mea sure of lobbying activity is more accurate for congres sional lobbying activities than it is for presidential or executive branch lobbying. We have not presented a full model of presidential-legislative relations. But we have
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found some intriguing results suggesting that presidential activities affect interest group mobilization only to the extent to which they are filtered through the impact of the president on Congress. Interest groups clearly respond differently to congressional and presidential actions depending on the policy domain. Presidential attention in policy domains where Congress has clear and widely understood autonomy has no effect on lobbying actions beyond that of hearings themselves. Presidential actions in those domains traditionally reserved for greater execu tive branch authority, on the other hand, depress congres sional lobbying because they divert lobbying energy away from Congress and toward the executive. Congres sional actions in areas within traditional congressional control stimulate substantially more lobbying mobiliza tion by both groups and hired lobbyists than Leech and colleagues had previously estimated. By including the measure of presidential actions, we improve our model of congressional lobbying. The substantive impact of our model including presidential actions in the model on con gressional mobilization of lobbying is that congressional actions have an even stronger impact on mobilizing lob byists than we had previously estimated, but only in those areas where Congress dominates. Where the president is an important player, his actions actually decrease con gressional lobbying.
Seventy years ago, Ernest Griffith (1939) noted the importance of communities of professionals in and around government dealing with the many details of public pol icy. His idea of "policy whirlpools" became part of the standard understanding of the policymaking process and remains relevant today. Over fifty years ago, David Truman's (1951) view of the mobilization of interests through social disruptions generated a new view of the dynamics of social mobilization and interest group activ ity in America. Since this time, scholars from Olson (1965) to Salisbury (1984; Heinz et al. 1993) to Walker (1983 Walker ( , 1991 have made this story more complete. More recently, a number of scholars have addressed the impact of large new government programs on the development of citizen mobilization surrounding those issues. These studies have focused on warrelated pensions (Skocpol 1992) , the Social Security program (Campbell 2005) , and the GI Bill (Mettler 2005) . In this article, like those that have preceded it (Leech et al. 2005; Baumgartner, Gray, and Lowery, forthcoming) , we add to this growing perspec tive. What we have shown does not rule out the possibil ity of growth in the interest group system being caused by societal changes or by the desires of interest groups them selves. In fact, we should expect all three forces to have an impact on interest group populations. What the analy sis does show, however, is the importance of government action as a mobilizing force in interest group activity. By providing a coordination point where there is a higher probability of a positive payoff, it encourages interest groups to mobilize around that issue rather than others. The level of government attention explains changes in interest group lobbying more than does government spend ing or the size of the economy in that area. Although gov ernment and the group system coevolve, we find that the influence of government on interest groups is stronger than the other way around.
The fact that presidential actions have a substantial depressive effect on congressional lobbying also sug gests that the goals of government transparency so com monly addressed in public speeches by public officials would be greatly enhanced by a revision of the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995 to expand greatly the number of "covered officials" in the executive branch. Our evidence strongly suggests that much is happening there that is not documented by the limited public disclosure of executive branch contacts now required by the law. Table 4 , the coefficient for hearings is 2.64; it was 2.63 in the original. 4. We do not replicate the analyses presented in Table 4 in the original publication. These used the number of hearings in the previous ten years rather than only in the contemporane ous sixmonth period. Replication of these results showed that the models were largely confirmed. However, with six teen time points rather than only four, as in the earlier article, the results were not significant in the model with a lagged dependent variable. This is because the number of hearings in the previous ten years is almost the same for each suc cessive sixmonth period. (If one thinks of a tenyear period consisting of twenty sixmonth windows, moving forward in time, the data are identical for eighteen of the twenty win dows, changing only by replacing one old window with one new one in each period. These differences are never very substantial.) The redundancy of including both this variable as well as the lagged dependent variable makes little sense. Findings were highly significant, as in the original, without the lagged dependent variable.
